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Assessment of the Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure
Control Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
fo_ Preparation of FMEA and CIL. l0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis (Reference i0) of the
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS)
hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to
the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the
CCB/PRCB presentations (Reference 8) and an informal criticality
summary listing (Reference 9). A discussion of each discrepancy
from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as
required. However, due to the cancellation of the IOA task, the
resolution of these discrepancies were not attempted. These
discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were
made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report
documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS
hardware.
The IOA product for the ARPCS analysis consisted of 273 failure
mode "worksheets" that resulted in 73 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as
of 24 December 1987) which consisted of 262 FMEAs and 87 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.
This comparison produced agreement on all but 124 FMEAs which
caused differences in 48 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.






Figure 1 - ARPCS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that will
be performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 ARPCS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The general ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.2. The ARPCS specific ground rules and
assumptions are presented in Appendix B.3.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The ARPCS provides shirt-sleeve environment for the crew by
pressurizing the cabin to 14.7 psia with approximately 21% oxygen
and 79% nitrogen. Cabin pressure can also be maintained at 8.0
psia for emergency (cabin leak) condition.
For the purpose of this study, the ARPCS was divided into two
sections and six assemblies as shown in Figure 2 for which a
brief discussion is provided below:
A. Atmospheric Make-up and Control (AMC) - This section uses
cryogenic oxygen and gaseous nitrogen for cabin pressure
maintenance and crew metabolic requirements. The AMC also
provides oxygen or nitrogen for EMU/MMU recharges, water
tanks pressurization, payload requirements, and
cabin/airlock repressurizations. Figure 3 presents an over-
view of the AMC and its major hardware components.
This section is further divided into the following three
assemblies:
i. Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly - This assembly provides
gaseous oxygen (approximately 50 lbm) to the
emergency breathing station under emergency conditions
and absence of cryogenic oxygen. This assembly
consists of one tank, a 300 psi regulator, a motorized
valve, and an isolation valve. The assembly interfaces
with the oxygen assembly at the crossover manifold and
emergency breathing station as shown in Figure 4.
This assembly is only installed on vehicle 0V102 as a
mission kit, and has not been removed.
o Oxygen Assembly - The oxygen assembly uses oxygen from
the cryogenic oxygen tanks and conditions it for
distribution through emergency breathing station, and
14.7 psia cabin regulators. It also provides oxygen
for EMU recharges, and spacelab habitable module
requirements.
The emergency breathing station regulates and delivers
the oxygen to Launch and Entry Helmets (LEHs) during
nominal ascent/entry phase, and continuously to LEH-5
during the on-orbit phase. Under cabin leak
conditions, this station will also deliver direct
(unregulated) cryogenic oxygen to the cabin through
direct bleed orifice.
The oxygen is nominally provided to the cabin through
either of two redundant loops. Oxygen from the
cryogenic tanks is warmed to gaseous state and reduced
to i00 psig before delivery to O2/N2 control panel.
The panel delivers i00 psig oxygen to the 14.7 psia
cabin regulator, and subsequently into the cabin for
pressure maintenance and crew usage. This oxygen
interfaces with the 200 psig nitrogen on the panel
before entering the cabin regulator•
The oxygen in the cabin is controlled either automati-
cally by one of two controllers, or manually by the
crew. In the Auto mode, the controllers sense the
partial pressure of oxygen in the cabin. If the PPO2
is below 3.2 +/- 0.2 psia, the controllers will close
the 02/N2 control valve allowing I00 psig oxygen to
flow to the 14.7 psia cabin regulators. Otherwise, the
02/N2 control valve will be open allowing 200 psig
nitrogen to flow to the cabin regulator, thus prevent-
ing I00 psig oxygen to flow. In the manual mode, this
operation is done by the crew based on continous
monitoring of the cabin total pressure and partial
pressure of oxygen.
• Nitrogen Assembly - The nitrogen assembly stores
gaseous nitrogen in four supply tanks, and uses it for
cabin pressure maintenance, MMU recharges, payload
requirements, and supply/waste water tanks
pressurization•
The nitrogen tanks are loaded prelaunch storing
approximately 262 Ibm of nitrogen• Tanks 1 and 2, and
Tanks 3 and 4 are manifolded together and referred to
as System I and System 2, respectively. System 1 and
System 2 are operated interchangeably through two
dedicated nitrogen loops with identical sets of
hardware• Capability is provided for a cross-tie
operation of the loops.
The nitrogen from the supply tanks are regulated to
200+/-15 psig before flowing to the 14.7 psia cabin
regulator, payload, and water tanks. Nitrogen require-
ment for MMU recharges is taken upstream of the 200
psig regulation. The cabin pressure maintenance is
provided by the 02/N2 control panel through combined
operation of the 14.7 psia cabin regulator and 02/N2
control valve. The 200 psig nitrogen interfaces with
I00 psig oxygen downstream of 02/N2 control valve
before entering the cabin regulator as discussed in the
oxygen assembly section•
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Be Atmospheric Vent and Control (AVC) - The AVC provides
capability to maintain cabin structural integrity under
excessive positive or negative pressure gradients• It will
also provide capability for rapid cabin depressurization and
prelaunch checkout.
This section is further divided into the following three
assemblies as shown by Figure 5:
I. Positive Relief Vent - The positive relief vent is
comprised of two separate and redundant loops which
provides capability to vent cabin atmosphere under high
(16 psia) cabin pressure. Each loop consists of a
motorized valve, and a relief valve. The motorized
valves are used to isolate the assembly.
. Negative Relief Vent - The negative relief vent is
comprised of dual redundant lines with self-operating
relief valves (one per loop). The relief valves will
permit atmospheric air into the cabin when outside
pressure rises 0.2 psia above cabin pressure.
• Cabin Vent - The cabin vent is comprised of two
identical motor driven valves which provide capability
to rapidly vent and check crew cabin pressure during
prelaunch operations. The vent valves are denied power
after liftoff (circuit breakers are pulled) to prevent
inadvertent decompression of the cabin•
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The ARPCS hardware is primarily divided between the mid-fuselage
and crew module. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show an overall representa-
tion and location of these equipment.
The ARPCS interfaces were established and studied to assess their
performance impact due to failure modes. The subsystem interfaces
were:
a. PRSD - The ARPCS receives cryogenic oxygen from The Power
Reactant, Supply, and Distribution Subsystem at high
pressure (800 to 850 psia) and low temperature (-280 F to
-220 F) for general usage.
So ATCS - The Active Thermal Control Subsystem provides heat
for thermal conditioning of the cryogenic oxygen to gaseous
oxygen through restrictors.
Ce ECLSS - The ARPCS interfaces with the Environmental Control
and Life Support Subsystem by providing oxygen/nitrogen for
airlock support activities, and supply/waste water tanks
pressurization.




oxygen/nitrogen ports for EMU/MMU recharges and spacelab
pressurization.
EPS - The Electrical Power Subsystem provides bus power to
drive electrical components, switches, display, and instru-
mentation throughout the ARPCS subsystem.
ARS - The gaseous oxygen and nitrogen are provided to the
Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem for circulation
throughout the crew cabin.
3.3 Hierarchy
For the purpose and ease of this analysis, the ARPCS was divided
into two main sections and six assemblies as shown in Figure 2.
g_
_z_
Figure 2 - ARPCS BREAKDOWNI
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Figure 5 - ATMOSPHERIC VENT AND CONTROL
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4.0 ASSESSI_IT/_ RESULTS
The IOA assessment was done based on the CCB/PRCB presentations
made by Mr. John Whalen and an informal criticality summary
listing provided by Mr. Chris Humphry/Boeing dated December 24,
1987. The CCB/PRCB presentations included detailed information
on the CIL items which provided for a good comparison of the FMEA
and IOA criticality results. For these items if a discrepancy
existed, IOA made a specific recommendation either accepting the
FMEA results or suggesting a change. The criticality summary
listing showed only the criticality, screens, and the failure
modes for each mechanical/electrical hardware item.
Consequently, it was difficult to understand the rationale behind
the criticalities in order to make an adequate assessment between
the FMEA and the IOA results. In these cases if a discrepancy
was noted, it was flagged as an issue pending receipt of more
detailed data. However, due to the termination of the IOA task,
this later process was not pursued and the discrepancies remain
as marked issues. Also, due to limited time remaining on the
task, no FMEA issue was discussed with the subsystem manager in
order to resolve them.
Appendix C provides assessment data for each failure mode and
respective hardware item. Significant issues noted are discussed
below:
o The FMEA considered the LEH panels as emergency systems,
and as such it was seen as potential for loss of life/vehicle
for any failure which resulted in loss of LEH usage. IOA
accepted this assumption with some reservations. First, the
LEH panels do not fit into the strict definition of the
emergency systems stated in the NSTS-22206 Para. 2.l.e. This
definition excludes hardware (such as LEH panels) which
performs a function used during any nominal mission phase or
during intact abort.
Second, there is no limitation as how broad this definition
will be used throughout the ARPCS. That is, any failure of
an item upstream of the LEH panels which negates the use of
the LEHs is compounded by the assumption that an emergency
condition exists. This approach seems to be too
conservative which may result in loss of visibility into an
item when studied under nominal conditions.
o The FMEA studied "cracked mounting flange" failure mode for
the cabin negative relief valve (FMEA 06-1-0203-3) and the
cabin positive relief valve (FMEA 06-1-0201-3). The causes
are listed as material defect, mechanical shock, and
vibration. IOA did not study this failure mode, and
considered the failure mode and cause relationship not
credible. The material defect is ruled out based on the IOA
general project groundrule (Appendix B.2.4), otherwise this
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failure mode should be included for all hardware items, the
mechanical shock and vibration are not realistic since their
magnitude must be very high and far beyond the structural
integrity of the vehicle in order to cause such a failure. Also,
this condition presumes a failure already in progress (vehicle
undergoing severe and dangerous condition) contrary to the NSTS-
22206 hardware criticality groundrules.
o FMEA studied "inability to restrict" as failure of the flow
restrictor. IOA considered this failure mode and cause
relationship not credible and it was therefore not studied.
There was no detailed FMEA information to further investigate
this failure mode.
o FMEA studied "restricted flow" for lines and fittings. IOA
studied this failure mode for appropriate hardware items on
the line. This was done primarily because the causes of flow
restriction (contamination, corrosion) most likely will
restrict flow at the hardware items (valves, screens,...etc)
before the line. Second, the restricted flow of an item at a
particular location on the line may yield different effects
and criticalities, and hence easier to investigate.
o IOA studied electrical solenoids and motors separately from
their associated valves, and did not find any reference to
them in the FMEA data. However, a match of these items were
made based on the FMEA results for the valve. The electrical
solenoids and motors may be either covered separately or the
failure modes and causes assessed for the valves should
address them.
The IOA analysis of the ARPCS hardware initially generated 266
failure mode worksheets and identified 89 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 22 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 262 FMEAs and 87 CIL
items. Upon completion of the assessment, of the 273 total IOA
failure modes 124 remained as issues to be resolved. The
expansion for these issues are provided on individual assessment
sheets in Appendix C.
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding
IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains additional IOA analysis
worksheets supplementing previous analysis results (Reference i0)
that were used to assess the FMEA/CIL. Appendix F provides a
cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA
assessment worksheet(s).
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment

























TOTA' l 262 l 273 I124
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment

























TOTAL l 87 i 73 i 48
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities




















Of the failure modes analyzed, 73 were determined to be critical
items distributed throughout ARPCS as shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items































TOTAL J13 i 54 i 3 l 1 I 2 i 73
A cross reference for assigning identification numbers to the IOA
assessment (Appendix C) and analysis worksheets (Appendix E) is
shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers







ARPCS-101 to -136, ARPCS-II31X,-1351X
ARPCS-136 to -212, ARPCS-1461X,-1501X,-1621X,
-1761X,-1791X & -2021X
ARPCS-212 to -331, ARPCS-2121X,-2161X,-2631X,
-2632X,-2661X,-2731X,-2961X,-3291X,
-367X,-368X & -369X
ARPCS-331 to -346, ARPCS-3431X
ARPCS-346 to -360, ARPCS-3481X












JSC-ECLSS 2102, Environmental Control and Life Support
Systems Workbook, November 21, 1983.
I0.
JSC-19935, Environmental Systems Console Handbook,
Basic Rev. A, October 15, 1985.
RI-MC621-0002, Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure




JSC-12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, Final PCN-3,
June 28, 1985.
JSC-V61-File III, Operations and Maintenance
Requirements and Specification Document, February 06,
1986.
NSTS-22206, Instruction for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), October 1986.
NASA CCB/PRCB Presentations, Atmospheric Revitalization
Pressure Control Subsystem, John Whalen.
FMEA/CIL Summary Listing, Informal Data, Chris Humphry,
December 24, 1987.
MDAC 1.0-TM-VA86001-30, Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis Of The Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure











































- Abort Once Around
- Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control
Subsystem
- Air Revitalization System
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort to Orbit
- Back-up Flight System
- Critical Item List
- Carbon Monoxide
- Carbon Dioxide
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning
- Criticality
- Direct Current
- Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Electrical Power Subsystem
- Extravehicular Activity
- Fahrenheit
- Flash Evaporator System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Ground Support Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Water
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Oriber Assessment
- Launch and Entry Helmets
- Lithium Hydroxide
- McDonnell_Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nitrogen
- National Space Transportation System




- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Potential Critical Items
- Partial Pressure of Oxygen
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
















- Remote Manipulator System
- Return to Launch Site
- Return to Landing Site
- Systems Management
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine




- Waste Management System
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Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, 10 O_tober 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO__AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCy CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILUR_ - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY M_$SION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
p_LAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
0NORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
_ND_NG/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions fo_
Preparation of FMEA/CI_, I0 October 1986, was employed with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
B-5
Appendix B
Definitions, Ground Rules, and Assumptions
B.3 ARPCS - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The following subsystem ground rules and assumptions were
considered in determining component criticalities:
i• The auxiliary oxygen assembly was assigned criticali-
ties based upon its emergency support function not
redundant to cryogenics oxygen supply.
Rationale: The auxiliary oxygen assembly is a mission
kit installed on OVI02 only. Its usage is
under severe cabin leak and loss of
cryogenic oxygen.
• The airlock and wet trash storage vents are considered
as part of the Environmental Control and Life Support
Subsystem (ECLSS) and therefore not studied in this
report.
Rationale: These subsystem interfaces were discussed
and decided by the NASA subsystem manager
(Mr. John Whalen) to be part of the ECLSS.
• A single cabin regulation/distribution loop is
considered adequate to maintain nominal pressure
throughout the mission.
Rationale: Flight Data File procedures have been
written, and the subsystem designed to
operate on one loop with the other loop
in standby redundancy.
• The oxygen and nitrogen contained within cabin volume
are adequate without make-up for safe and nominal
return.
Rationale: Under nominal 3.2 psia PPO2 cabin pressure,
and return duration (approximately 4 hours
from deorbit prep to touchdown), there is
adequate oxygen to meet crew metabolic.
o The PASS/BFS displays are not considered redundant to
an on-board meter display when studying the meter
failure modes•
Rationale: The PASS/BFS failure is considered








Each LEH panel is considered to be dedicated to a crew
person, and as such it is not redundant to the others.
Rationale: A crew person is not denied oxygen in order
to meet the demand of others.
During a cabin leak condition, no oxygen flow is
considered through 8/14.7 psi, regulators. Oxygen is
provided to the crew and cabin through LEH's and direct
bleed orifice respectively.
Rationale: Severe cabin leak and oxygen flow through
regulators will deplete crogenic oxygen
rapidly. Oxygen is only needed to keep the
crew alive not to maintain cabin pressure.
Pressurization of cabin or any compartment with direct
and unregulated oxygen is considered a serious fire
hazard, thus creating a potential condition for loss of
life/vehicle.
Rationale: Oxygen by itself will not cause fire, but
the condition created is volatile for fire.
Pressurization of cabin or any compartment with direct
and unregulated nitrogen is considered a potential for
structural failure• Furthermore, in an event when ARPCS
will be depleted of consumable nitrogen, a potentially
critical condition is created due to loss of capability
to maintain cabin/water tanks pressure.
Rationale: The nitrogen tanks are pressurized at
approximately 3300 psia, and any enclosed
compartment will be excessively pressurized
with a direct leakage. The degree of
pressurization, location and severity of
failure are moot. The author has taken a
conservative view on the subject.
Cabin pressure will be adequate to maintain water dump
and FES (Flash Evaporator System) operations in the
event of pressure loss from ARPCS.
Rationale: Under nominal 14.7 psia cabin pressure, the
FES and water dump operations will not be
affected, but rather minimized. Adequate
pressure exists to expel the water.
Nitrogen and oxygen flow sensors are considered mission





Rationale: Loss of these instrumentation creates a
condition whereby a cabin leak may not be
easily and readily detected for successful
completion of the mission.
Any voluntary cabin vent is accomplished through
airlock/vent valves during on-orbit.
Rationale: Due to high cabin vent rate through the
cabin vent/isolation valves, this option
is not viable.
The prelaunch criticality was considered to be of
mission impact only when that failure caused loss of
life/vehicle or loss of mission any time from liftoff
to landing.
Rationale: No launch was considered performed when a
failure may result in loss of life/vehicle





This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :


























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
] *
3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK MISSION
KIT IS NO LONGER FLOWN.











AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (1)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.














AUX. 02 SUPPLY TANK (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY OXYGEN TANK IS
NO LONGER FLOWN AND AS A RESULT THE FAILURE MORE DOES NOT APPLY.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CO,mARE [ / ] C ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COSPARE [ IN ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.












LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2015-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION INDICATION, DS8 (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE ITEMS AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS. SEE ALSO ARPCS-238, -250, AND -334.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: ii0
ITEM: DIODE, DS8 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE DIODES WERE STUDIED AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS, SEE ARPCS-239, 251, AND 341.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0105-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CP] CP]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR IN A SEPARATE ANALYSIS FROM
THE VALVE, AND ACCEPTS FMEA RESULT.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0105-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/SHUTOFF VALVE (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED A SEPARATE ANALYSIS FOR THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR.
HOWEVER, SINCE THE 02 TANK IS NO LONGER FLOWN, IOA AGREES WITH
THE FMEA.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ NA] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2017-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /9 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN. THE FME CRIT SUMMARY SHOWED A MAJOR DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN THE JSC AND RI CRITS, AND IOA CHOSE THE JSC CRIT.











RESISTOR, A9R2, 5.1K (1)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
ALSO SEE ARPCS-II6, 244, 256, AND 340.
AT APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE RESISTORS ARE STUDIED





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, A9R2, 5.1K (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE_:
ALSO SEE ARPCS-II5, 244, 256, AND 340.
AT APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE RESISTORS ARE STUDIED






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2016-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [






IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.

















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ 3
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






THIS FAILURE MODE (INABILITY TO MAKE/DEMATE) ONLY AFFECTS
PRELAUNCH SERVICING OF THE TANK. SEE ARPCS-121 FOR INTERNAL
LEAKAGE. THIS PROCESS MAY BE OUTSIDE THE MISSION PHASE, AND AS
SUCH IT MAY BE DELETED.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE QD AND CAP ARE STUDIED TOGETHER.














FILTER, I0 MICRONS (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY OXYGEN TANK IS
NO LONGER FLOWN AND AS A RESULT THEFAILURE MODE DOES HOT APPLY.



















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [











] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY OXYGEN TANK IS
NO LONGER FLOWN AND AS A RESULT THE FAILURE MODE DOES NOT APPLY.





NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] C ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS, SINCE THE AUXILIARY OXYGEN TANK IS
NO LONGER FLOWN AND AS A RESULT THE FAILURE MODE DOES NOT APPLY.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] C P ] C ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA SINCE THE TANK IS NO LONGER FLOWN.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0109-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
126




[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:











NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0109-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C ] *
IOA C I /i ] C ] C ] C ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0109-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)




THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE CLARIFIED TO REFER TO EITHER IST OR 2ND
STAGES OF THE REGULATOR. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE
AUXILIARY 02 TANK, IOA RECOMMENDS 3/IR CRITICALITY.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FMEA FAILURE MODE SHOULD SPECIFY THE TYPE OF LEAKAGE.
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE MAY REQUIRE A SEPARATE FMEA. SEE ARPCS-131.
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK, THE
IOA CRITICALITY IS CHANGED TO 3/IR.











RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]











RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CALLS FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE SEPARATELY. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT
BE AS PART OF THE FMEA, SINCE IT DID NOT SPECIFY THE TYPE OF
LEAKAGE. SEE ARPCS-129. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK,
THE IOA CRITICALITY IS CHANGED TO 3/IR.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED "INABILITY TO CLOSE" AND "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" AS ONE
- SEE ALSO ARPCS-132A.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.












LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ S ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA (INTERNAL LEAKAGE) WAS CONSIDERED SAME AS THE
"INABILITY TO CLOSE" - SEE ARPCS-132 (06-1-0114-1). THE TWO FMEA
CRITICALITIES SEEM TO BE ASSIGNED INCONSISTANTLY.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN.



















NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
ix]
[ ]























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE AUXILIARY 02 TANK IS NO
LONGER FLOWN. THIS WILL ONLY APPLY TO THE LINES DOWNSTREAM OF
THE ISOLATION VALVE. SEE ISOLATION VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE ARPCS-
134.





NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM WAS RECLASSIFIED AND MOVED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM,
THEREFORE IOA WITHDRAWS ITS RELATED ANALYSIS FROM THE ARPCS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] C NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA ASSUMING THAT CABIN VOLUME IS AVAILABLE
FOR A SAFE RETURN UNDER THIS ITEM FUNCTIONAL LOSS. ALSO, FOR
MISSIONS WITH EVA, CAPABILITY TO REPRESS EMUs WILL BE LOST.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVE WILL FORCE BOTH VALVES TO BE
SHUT DOWN CLOSED, THUS DENYING 02 TO THE EMERGENCY BREATHING
STATION IF NEEDED. ALSO, FOR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY, THE 02 LEAK
WILL INCREASE PPO2 IN CABIN POSING SERIOUS FIRE HAZARD
- A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. OTHERWISE, CABIN VOLUME
IS AVAILABLE FOR SAFE RETURN. THESE VALVES ARE NOT CLASSIFIED AS
EMERGENCY SYSTEM, AND THUS IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT LEHs ARE IN
USE FOR THE EMERGENCY CONDITION STATED IN THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0111-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
IX]
[ ]











SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CO,ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR-AI2RI & R2/5.1K (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [_ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
RE2_:
ALSO SEE ARPCS-304 AND 315.
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE RESISTORS ARE STUDIED AT THEIR














CIRCUIT BREAKER-CBI9 & CB20 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COSPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2010-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER-CB19 & CB20 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C





NEW [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM





(If different from NASA)
]. [ ] [ ] [ ] J
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA RESULTS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0115-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:


























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0116-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO I0 LBM/HR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPARISON IS DONE FOR LOOP2 ORIFICE RESTRICTED FLOW. THE
FAILURE OF ONE FILTER DOES NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THIS LOOP
SINCE THERE ARE TWO ORIFICES - ONE HIGHER DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY
THAN LOOP1. FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL LEAVE CREW WITH CABIN VOLUME
TO RETURN. SEE ALSO ARPCS-147.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0116-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO i0 LBM/HR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (IfdifferentfromNASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:























[i/i ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT INTO ANY LIFE THREATENING SITUATION.
IT WILL ONLY CAUSE THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE EMERGENCY
BREATHING STATION. LEH VALVES, AND/OR O2-XOVR VALVES MAY BE USED
TO ISOLATE THE STATION. OXYGEN IS STILL AVAILABLE THROUGH
CABIN REGULATORS INTO THE CABIN.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE2_:











NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
ix]
[ ]


















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















LEH 02 REGULATOR (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[x]
[ ]











LEG 02 REGULATOR (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]











RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]



















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:















RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITILICATY SUMMARY LIST FORM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.








NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 159
ITEM: FILTER-10 MICRONS (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE SAME EFFECTS AS DESCRIBED FOR THE
REGULATORS, ARPCS-155.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE IS NO EFFECT EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF THE
DOWNSTREAM ITEMS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0123-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 161
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA CRITICALITY INDICATES A POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
EXISTS WITH FUNCTIONAL LOSS. IOA CONSIDERS NO MAJOR EFFECT WITH
FUNCTIONAL LOSS - CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON THE AFFECTED LEG. FMEA
ALSO CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE IN COMBINATION WITH A FAILED
OPEN RELIEF VALVE TO ARRIVE AT POSSIBILITY OF LOSS OF LIFE. IOA
CONCLUDES THAT THIS IS A MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO, AND AT WORST
THE LINES WILL BE CLOSED TO STOP OXYGEN FLOW. EVEN WITH THE
RELIEF VALVE FAILURE IN MIND, THE TOTAL LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES
(BOTH CHECK VALVES) WILL BE ONE STEP AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE.
THEREFORE, WITH ONLY A SINGULAR FAILURE, HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS
INSIGNIFICANT AND, WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION, MISSION IS TERMINATED
TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBILITY OF RELIEF VALVE FAILURE. AT WORST,
IOA RECOMMEND A 3/2R CRIT.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0123-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 162
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE LEHs HAVE DEDICATED SELF-SEALING DISCONNECTS WHICH CLOSES THE
02 FLOW UPON REMOVAL OF THE LEHs. ALSO REGULATOR INLET VALVES,
OR THE O2-XOVR VALVES MAY BE USED TO ISOLATE THE LINE. AT ANY
RATE, THIS FAILURE WILL FLOW 02 INTO THE CABIN, AND PCS MAY
BE OPERATED MANUALLY TO CONTROL 02 LEVEL, OTHERWISE NO MAJOR
IMPACT. THE VALVES ARE CONSIDERED NOT REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
AT WORST, MANUAL OPERATION OF THE PCS MAY SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT
MISSION TIMELINE (3/2R). THE FMEA REDUNDANCY MIXES INTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE WITH THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE QD. THE
REDUNDANCY IN THIS ANALYSIS SHOULD BE IN REGARD TO THE BLOCKAGE
OF THE 02 FLOW. BLOCKAGE OF THE 02 FLOW IS LOST THRU VALVE
FAILED OPEN, AND IS COMPENSATED FOR BY THE QD. SUBSEQUENT QD
LOSS
WILL BE ALSO INTERNAL LEAKAGE OR FAILED OPEN WHICH WILL FLOW 02
INTO THE HELMET.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA WILL RESULT IN EFFECTS AS EXPLAINED IN 06-1-1501-3
(ARPCS-165), AND THEREFORE THE SAME CRITICALITY.

























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA'S BREAK PEAP/LEH SERVICE INTO 4 CREW COMP, 4 PASSENGER
COMPARTMENT.
SAME EFFECT AS 06-1-1501-3.
CRITICALITY WILL APPLY
(ARPCS-165), AND THE SAME
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ].
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE (OPEN) WILL NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. IF THE
LEH IS IN USE, THEN THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH THE QD TO BE OPEN,
AND IF IT IS NOT IN USE, THE LEH SOV SHOULD BE CLOSED. VALVES
WERE ASSUMED NON-REDUNDANT AND DEDICATED PER CREW PERSON.
FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL BE SAME EFFECT AS EXPLAINED IN ARPCS-163.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, THIS IS TREATED SAME AS 06-1-1501-3.
(ARPCS-165) IF THE LEAKAGE IS EXCESSIVE ENOUGH WHICH DENIES 02 TO
THE LEH WHEN NEEDED.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FOR, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, TREATED SAME AS 06-1-1501-2 (ARPCS-163).
THAT IS NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM UNDER A SINGULAR FAILURE, AND
FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL AFFECT PCS OPERATION AS EXPLAINED FOR ARPCS-
163.





NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LEH #5, BLEED ORIFICE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]






















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [. ] [ ] [



























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE.
C ]
C ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
_ASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE - QD & CAPS ARE ANALYZED
TOGETHER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i 3 [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/1 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




JUDGING FROM JUST A SUMMARY FMEA DATA PROVIDED, IOA DID NOT
DIFFERENTIATE THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM 06-1-1512-2
(ARPCS-174).





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
t / _ t _ t _ t
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICAL SUMMARY LIST FROM POST
51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS
ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA ANALYSES
ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FME #: 06-1-0119-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLOW SENSOR MT11&MT12 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:












ITEM: C&W-O2/N2 FLOW (i)





NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0129-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE SENSOR, REGULATOR INLET - MT3 & MT4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0125-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REGULATOR INLET SOY (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0125-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FME AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














REGULATOR INLET SOV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
Ix]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











REGULATOR , 100 PSIG (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.











REGULATOR - i00 PSIG (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE LEAK MAY BE ISOLATED BY THE
REGULATOR INLET SOV, AND STILL PROVIDE 02 TO THE EMERGENCY
BREATHING STATION.











RELIEF VALVE, 245 PSIG (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ) [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:




























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAILASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:









NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0135-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 193
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SEE ARPCS-366 FOR THE FAILURE WITH SPACELAB.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0135-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 194
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0135-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 195
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 196
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0134-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS FOR WHEN THE SAPCELAB IS NOT FLOWN. THE FMEA SHOULD BE
WRITTEN TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SPACELAB FLOWN AND NOT FLOW
CONDITIONS-SEE ARPCS-198.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIE ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0134-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 198
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [. ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0134-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 199
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE CONDITION WITHOUT SPACELAB. FMEA SHOULD BE
WRITTEN TO DIFFERENTIATE CONDITIONS WITH AND WITHOUT PAYLOAD.
SEE ALSO ARPCS-200.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIE ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0134-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 200
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA IF SPACELAB (PAYLOAD) FLOWN WHICH
REQUIRES THE VALVE TO BE OPEN - SEE ALSO ARPCS-199.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0134-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 201
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA )
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AN FMEA MATCH WAS NOT FOUND FOR THIS ITEM.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0136-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PRESSURE SENSOR, MT7 & MT8 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:















14.7 PSI REG INLET SOV (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]





14.7 PSI REG INLET SOY (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0140-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






14.7 PSI REGULATOR (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-I-0141-2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






8 PSI REGULATOR (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











8 PSI REGULATOR (2)





NA-_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]











8 PSI REGULATOR (2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER, UNDER NOMINAL CIRCUMSTANCES
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED.





NASA FMEA # : 06-1-0161-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: N2 TANKS (4)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 510LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0161-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: N2 TANKS (4)





NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEAAND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED N2 LINES FROM THE SUPPLY TANKS TO THE SUPPLY
VALVES. THIS LEAK CAN NOT BE STOPPED, AND MAY RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE COMPARTMENT
AREA. SEE ALSO ARPCS-196 AND 329.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 510L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE - OUTSIDE MISSION PHASE.











GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (I)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 217
ITEM: GSE CAP (I)









NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE - OUTSIDE MISSION PHASE.








ITEM: GSE CAP (I)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS. THE ITEM IS ANALYZED WITH
THE RELATED PD AS PART OF 06-1-0166-4 (ARPCS-2161X).













GSE FILTER (1)-10 MICRONS
M.J. SAIIDI
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM WAS RECLASSIFIED AND MOVED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
THEREFORE IOA WITHDRAWS ITS RELATED ANALYSIS FROM THE ARPCS.











GSE FILTER (1)-10 MICRONS







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / _ [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N IN ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM WAS RECLASSIFIED AND MOVED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
THEREFORE IOA WITHDRAWS ITS RELATED ANALYSIS FROM THE ARPCS.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
CO_PARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]















[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA EXPLANATION, HOWEVER, DISAGREES ON THE
ASSIGNMENT OF CRITICALITY.























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-2151-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION INDICATION, DS8&DS9 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



















ITEM: DIODE, DS8&DS9 (4)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-203000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE BROKEN INTO APPROPRIATE ITEMS AND THEIR
FAILURE MODES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-203000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE BROKEN INTO APPROPRIATE ITEMS AND THEIR
FAILURE MODES.













NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
228
SWITCH-SI0&SI1, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEAAND IOA
ANALYSESARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
228
SWITCH-SI0&S11, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-203000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH-SI0&Sll, MMU ISOL VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
229
SWITCH-S10&S11, MMU ISOL VLV (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB69&CB74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB69&CB74-MMU ISOL VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0231-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 232
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA(ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0165-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2-SYSTEM ISOL. VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE, AND
THIS COMPARISON WAS MADE BASED ON THE FMEA ANALYSIS FOR THE
VALVE.













NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
237
SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2-SYSTEM ISOL. VLV (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE, AND
THIS COMPARISON WAS MADE BASED ON THE FMEA ANALYSIS FOR THE
VALVE.













NEW C x ]
ARPCS
238
POSITION INDICATION, DS6&DS10 (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE ITEMS AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS-SEE ALSO ARPCS-109, 250, AND -334.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE DIODES AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS-SEE ALSO ARPCS-II0, -251 AND -341.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, S13&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VALVES ARE DRIVEN OPEN PRELAUNCH, AND CONTINUE TO OPERATE THE
PCS WITH THE FAILED SWITCH. WITH FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY LOSS,
ONLY TWO TANKS REMAIN FOR COMPLETION OF MISSION. THIS MAY NOT BE
ADEQUATE FOR SOME MISSION WITH HIGH N2 DEMAND (EVAs). CABIN
VOLUME IS AVAILABLE FOR SAFE RETURN. DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA
(ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM POST 51-L ANALYSIS)
RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THE
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN
ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
241
SWITCH, SI3&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED SWITCH FAILURE TO CLOSE THE VALVE OR A SINGE
CONTACT WHICH WOULD DRIVE VALVE CLOSED. IN THIS CASE, ONE N2
LOOP WILL BE LOST, AND ONLY ONE N2 LOOP AND CABIN VOLUME REMAIN.
WITH FUNCTIONAL LOSS, CABIN VOLUME IS ADEQUATE FOR SAFE RETURN-
ONE STEP AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF A RAPID CABIN
DECOMPRESSION WERE TO HAPPEN.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2012-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA FAILURE ALSO COVERS "INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS
PREMATURELY, SHORTS".





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7& CBI8/N2 SUPPLY ISOL. VLV.
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF POWER TO THE N2 SUPPLY VALVES, BUT THE VALVES ARE OPENED
PRELAUNCH, AND WILL REMAIN OPEN THROUGHOUT MISSION. THEREFORE
LOSS OF POWER WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE THE LINE IF
NEEDED (LEAK DOWNSTREAM). THIS SCENARIO WILL DEPLETE N2, AND
MISSION WILL RETURN WITH CABIN VOLUME (3/2R)-MULTIPLE FAILURE.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR A10R1&A17R1(5.1K)/N2-SUPPLY ISOL. VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE ARPCS-II5, 116, 256 AND 340. THE RESISTORS ARE STUDIED
AT APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0171-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0171-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REGULATOR INLET VALVE LV1 & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0171-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REGULATOR INLET VALVE LVl & LV2/ N2 SYSTEM (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0171-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE (ARPCS-246),
BUT BASE ON THE VALVE THE FMEA MATCH IS MADE. IOA AGREES WITH
THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0171-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2 REGULATOR INLET VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA STUDIED THE MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE. THE FMEA SHOWN
IS FOR THE VALVE (ARPCS-245).





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2015-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION INDICATION, DS7 & DS11 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THES ITEMS AT THE
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS-SEE ALSO ARPCS-109, -238, AND -334.











DIODE, DS7 & DS11 (4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE DIODES AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCAITONS - SEE ALSO APRCS-II0, -239, -341.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2019-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, $14 & S22/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2019-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, $14 & S22/REG. INLET VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE RESULTS IN THE SAME SCENARIO AS WAS DISCUSSED
IN THE FMEA 06-1-0171-1 (ARPCS-246). UNDER FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY, CABIN VOLUME (UNLIKE REDUNDANCY) IS AVAILABLE FOR A
SAFE RETURN. FOUR N2 TANKS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE THE
MISSION WITH ONE N2 LOOP.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
254
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB21/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FMEA ALSO COVERS "CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, SHORTS". IOA IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH FMEA.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
255
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB20 & CB21/REG. INLET VALVE (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF POWER TO THE MOTOR DRIVEN VALVE. HOWEVER VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN ITS NOMINAL OPEN POSITION PRIOR TO FAILURE. LOSS OF
ABILITY TO DRIVE THE VALVE TO CLOSED POSITION AFTER A FIALURE
(SUCH AS LEAK) DOWNSTREAM. FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY LOSS WILL LEAVE
ONLY ONE N2-LOOP TO MAINTAIN NOMINAL MISSION. THIS MAY NOT BE
ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A MISSION WITH HIGH N2 DEMANDING ACTIVITIES
(EVA) AND LEAVE ADEQUATE RESERVES FOR EMERGENCY DEORBIT.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR, A18RI & A11R1 (5.1K)/REG. INLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE ARPCS-II5, 116, 244, AND 340. THE RESITORS ARE STUDIED
AT THEIR APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COSPARE [ N I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
257




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
RE}_:




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
258




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0172-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:



















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
260
NITROGEN REGULATOR VALVE (200 PSIG)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE AFFECTED REGULATOR CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHOUT ANY
PROBLEM OR SWITCH TO THE REDUNDANT LEG. SECOND STAGE REGULATOR
WILL REGULATE THE PRESSURE TO SPEC LEVEL.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0173-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]














NITROGEN RELIEF VALVE (275 PSIG) (2)









NASA [ 3 /IR ]





COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] IN] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] CP] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF BOTH N2 LOOPS FOR CABIN
PRESSURIZATION IF THE HIGH PRESSURE LINES COULD NOT BE
CONTROLLED. BUT CABIN VOLUME IS ADEQUATE FOR SAFE RETURN. HIGH
N2 PRESSURE IS CONTAINED IN THE LINE(S).
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0192-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 263
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS







[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0193-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 263
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















FILTER/CHECK VALVE, AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














FILTER/CHECK VALVE AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE FAILURE IN THE STANDBY ITEM WILL
NOT BE DETECTED UNTIL THAT LOOP BECOMES OPERATIONAL.














FILTER/CHECK VALVE AFTER N2 REGULATOR VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0180-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 267
ITEM: FLOW SENSOR (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REY_:









NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0152-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 269
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ], [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0152-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 270
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2 }





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0152-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 271
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAILASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.











ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)



















ORIFICE i0 LBM/HR (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N I ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CISRETENTION RATIONALE:





















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
3 [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS:




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




AT WORST CASE THE LEAK MAY BE FROM BOTH LOOPS IN WHICH CASE IT
CAN BE ISOLATED BY CLOSING BOTH N2 SUPPLY VALVES AND RETURN ON
CABIN VOLUME.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FORM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N 3 [ N 3 [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE N2-LINE UPSTREAM OF THE WATER TANK
N2 ISOLATION VALVE. THE ENTIRE N2-LOOP COULD BE CLOSED AND WATER
PRESSURIZATION SUPPLIED BY THE REDUNDANT N2-LOOP OR CABIN
PRESSURE IF THERE IS A LEAK. OTHERWISE AND UNDER NOMINAL
CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS NO MAJOR IMPACT SINCE THE VALVE IS
GENERALLY LEFT OPEN. SEE ALSO ARPCS-279.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYESS ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.















SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CABIN VOLUME IS ALSO CONSIDERED FOR PRESSURIZING THE TANKS. BUT
WITH COMPLETE FUNCTIONAL LOSS, THE FES CANNOT BE OPERATED.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYESS ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SHUTOFF VALVE, H20 TANK REGULATOR INLET VALVE





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
[ ]
[ ]














REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]














REGULATOR, 15.5-17 PSIG (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FORM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS-


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] [ ] c ] c
































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
ARPCS-288
06-1-0227-3
CO.ARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0228-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






H20 ALTERNATE PRESSURE VALVE (i)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
290




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2024-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 291
ITEM: SWITCH, S28 (i)







NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:

















ITEM: SWITCH, $28 (1)












[i/I ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] •
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:















CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB15 (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2023-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB15 (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2025-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COgPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0149-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVl&LV2 (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0149-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVl&LV2 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:









NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0149-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






O2/N2 CONTROL VALVE, LVI&LV2 (2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :




















POSITION INDICATOR/N2/O2 CONTROLLER VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
301
SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COXPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA BASED ON EXPLANATION GIVE IN ARPCS-317.
HOWEVER, THE SWITCH FAILURE TO TRANSFER NEEDS TO BE DIVIDED INTO
TWO FAILURE MODES DEPENDING ON THE POSITION OF SWITCH PRIOR TO
THE FAILURE.















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
301
SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA BASED ON EXPLANATION GIVEN FOR ARPCS-317.
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FMEA TO BE DIVIDED INTO TWO SEPARATE
FAILURE MODES: "INADVERTENTLY OPENS", AND "INADVERTENTLY
CLOSES". THESE TWO MODES WILL RESULT IN TWO DIFFERENT
CORRECTING ACTIONS, EVEN IF THE CRITS ARE THE SAME.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, S16&S19/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT 05-6VA-2002-I BE
BROKEN INTO TWO FAILURE MODES SINCE "FAILS TO OPEN" AND "FAILS TO
CLOSE" RESULT IN TWO SEPARATE EFFECTS AND CORRECTING ACTION EVEN
IF CRITS ARE THE SAME.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT 05-6VA-2002-I BE
BROKEN INTO TWO FAILURE MODES SINCE "FAILS TO OPEN" AND "FAILS TO
CLOSE" RESULT IN TWO SEPARATE EFFECTS AND CORRECTING ACTION EVEN
IF CRITS ARE THE SAME.














SWITCH, SI6&SI9/O2/N2 CONTROLLER VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA # : 05-6VA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K/O2/N2 VALVE SWITCH (5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE ARPCS-142 AND 315. THESE RESISTORS ARE APPLIED AT
APPROPRIATE LOCATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH SI7/PPO2 SENSOR A&B (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH SI7/PPO2 SENSOR A&B (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAILASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF HIGHTER PPO2 IN THE CABIN FOR
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY LOSS. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE O2/N2 VALVE
ALLOWING ONLY 02 TO FLOW INTO THE CABIN RESULTING EVENTUALLY IN
02 RICH CABIN-FIRE HAZARD.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMEN TOF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.

















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















PPO2 SENSORS A+B (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA EFFECTS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF 02 RICH
CABIN RESULTING FROM O2/N2 VALVE TO GO CLOSED ALLOWING ONLY 02 TO
FLOW.











PPO2 SENSORS A+B (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COM?ARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMEN TOF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0146-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 312
ITEM: PPO2 SENSOR-C (i)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ S /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED A SEPARATE ANALYSIS ON PPO2-C SENSOR SINCE IT IS
NOT USED FOR 02/N2 CONTROLLER OPERATION. ITS CRITICALITY WAS
ASSIGNED BASED ON ITS VOTING CAPABILITY AND AFTER PPO2-A AND B
ARE NO LONGER OPERATIONAL.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF HTIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMA AND IOA ANALYSES
ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














SWITCH, PPO2 CONTROLLER (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















SWITCH, PPO2 CONTROLLER (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE ARPCS-304 AND 142. THESE RESISTORS ARE CONSIDERED AT
THEIR APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB18&CBI9 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI8&CB19 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH FMEA CRITICALITY CONSIDERING THAT CABIN VOLUME
IS ADEQUATE FOR RETURN. HOWEVER, IT BECOMES
JUDGMENTAL/SUBJECTIVE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE MISSION AFTER THE
FIRST FAILURE KNOWING THAT THE SECOND FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE MISSION MOVES INTO A
PRIORITY FLIGHT AFTER THE FIRST FAILURE, THEN THAT WOULD BE
CONSIDERED A MISSION IMPACT AND IOA CRITICALITY WOULD STAND -
COULD NOT MAKE SUCH JUDGEMENTS/DECISIONS.














SWITCH, S6/PPO2 SELECTOR (1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























METER, M4/PPO2 READING (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMA_ :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, $5/O2/N2 FLOW SELECTOR (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, M3/O2/N2 FLOW READING (i)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
R_:















CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (1)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THAT THE LOSS CAN BE MET BY MONITORING CABIN
DP/DT, AIRLOCK DP SENSOR, OR 02/N2 FLOW RATE SENSORS. HOWEVER,
WITHOUT SUCH REDUNDANT INSTRUMENTATION THE CREW WILL NOT BE ABLE
TO ASSESS THE CABIN PRESSURE INTEGRITY. THIS FUNCTIONAL LOSS
WAS FELT TO BE SERIOUS TO WARRANT AN ABORT DECISION.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAILASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














METER, M4/CABIN PRESSURE READING (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.











CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (1)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA CONSIDERED THAT THE LOSS CAN BE MET BY CABIN PRESSURE
SENSOR, AIRLOCK DP SENSOR, OR HIGH 02/N2 FLOW RATES. HOWEVER,
WITHOUT SUCH REDUNDANT INSTRUMENTATION, THE CREW COULD NOT
EVALUATE THE CABIN PRESSURE STATUS AND A CABIN LEAK. THIS IS
FELT TO BE A RISKY SITUATION REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ACTION POSSIBLY
LEADING TO AN ABORT DECISION.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.














METER, M3/DP/DT READING (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2026-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






METER, M3/DP/DT READING (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE FMEA CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WAS NOT DONE AND SHOWN TBD.
THEREFORE, IOA COULD NOT MAKE A JUDGMENT AT THIS TIME.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2022-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (I)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2022-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI6/DP/DT (i)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J° SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0191-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 329
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED N2 LINES FROM THE SUPPLY REGULATORS TO THE CABIN
REGULATORS. WITH FUNCTIONAL LOSS, CABIN VOLUME IS AVAILABLE FOR
SAFE RETURN. HOWEVER, IF LEAK OCCURS AT THE COMMON O2/N2
MANIFOLD, IT WILL ALSO RESULT IN 02 LEAK - FIRE HAZARD AND LOSS
OF ONE O2/N2 REGULATION. SEE ARPCS-196 & -214.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE BUTTERFLY ISOLATION VALVE FAILURE SEPARATELY
FROM THE RELIEF VALVE FAILURE. SEE ARPCS-342. IOA AGREES WITH
THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0201-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION VALVE/MOTOR DRIVEN (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE.
(ARPCS-330), BUT THE MATCHING IS DONE BASED ON THE FMEA FOR THE
VALVE. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE.
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2015-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POSITION INDICATION, DS1, DS2 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C 3 C 3 [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE ITEMS AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS - ARPCS-109, -238, AND -250.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2021-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THIS SCENARIO TO BE SAME AS THE ARPCS-338 FOR THE
SWITCH FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE. ALSO SEE ARPCS-336. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.














SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS THIS ANALYSIS WHICH IS MORE APPROPRIATELY COVERED
BY ARPCS-337.














SWITCH, SI&S2/POSITIVE RELIEF VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. IOA CONSIDERED SWITCH FAILURE WHICH
CAUSES INADVERTENT CLOSING OF VALVE. THIS IS SAME AS ARPCS-331.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB17&CB22 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE VALVES ARE LEFT OPEN THROUGHOUT THE MISSION, AND WITH THIS
FAILURE THEY CANNOT BE CLOSED IF NEEDED. NOMINALLY, THERE IS NO
MAJOR EFFECT SINCE THE RELIEF VALVE DOWNSTREAM IS ASSUMED
OPERATING NOMINALLY. HOWEVER, FUNCTIONALLY AN ABORT DECISION
SHOULD BE INITIATED, BECAUSE IF THE RELIEF VALVE WERE TO FAIL
OPEN, THE RESULT COULD BE CATASTROPHIC. IOA AGREES WITH THE
FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7&CB22 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, AIRI & A2R1, 5.1K (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ALSO SEE ARPCS-II5, -116, -244, & -256. THE RESISTORS ARE
STUDIED AT THEIR APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, DS1 & DS2 (4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT STUDIED THESE DIODES AT THEIR
APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS - SEE ALSO ARPCS-II0, -239, & -251.











RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA FOR THE FAILURE IN THE RELIEF VALVE
ONLY. THE BUTTERFLY MOTORIZED VALVE SHOULD BE ANALYZED
SEPARATELY - SEE ARPCS-330.











RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C






















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C




















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]











VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT FOR THE SCREEN
REDUNDANCY C. IOA COULD NOT EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF THIS SCREEN.
























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
THE FMEAs 06-1-0203-1 AND -0203-2 ARE THE SAME AND MAY BE
COMBINED INTO ONE.














VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)





NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE
(ARPCS-349). DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY
SUMMARY LIST FROM POST 51-LANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN
NASA FMEA AND
IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.








NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 351
ITEM: SWITCH, $3 & $4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)















NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 352
ITEM: SWITCH, $3 & $4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 353
ITEM: SWITCH, $3 & $4




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NEW [ X )
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 354
ITEM: SWITCH, $3 & $4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















POSITION INDICATION, DS3, DS4 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
ARPCS
356
RESISTOR, A3RI, A4R1, 5.1K (2)
M.J. SAIIDI
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [




















DIODE, DS3 &DS4 (4)




HDWIFUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CO,ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C






ALSO SEE ARPCS-359. IOA CONSIDERED FAILED CLOSED AND OPEN
SEPARATE LY.
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ M /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0206-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 360
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE (2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
IX]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B. SCREEN B
WOULD FAIL, SINCE IT IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE AS WHEN THE CAP
SHOULD POP. THE CAPS AND RELIEF VALVES WORK AUTOMATICALLY
(WITHOUT CREW ACTION) BASED ON CABIN/ATMOSPHERE PRESSURE
DIFFERENTIAL.














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
ix]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[x]
[ ]








ITEM: DEBRIS SCREEN (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [













NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 365
ITEM: DEBRIS SCREEN (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] C ]
C ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0135-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 366
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FORM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER.
SEE ALSO ARPCS-193.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS LOSS OF THE RADIATOR OR AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEMS
UNASSOCIATED WITH THE LOSS OF QD/CAP. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF QD/CAP
MAY ONLY NEGATE THE FES OPERATION AND THIS IS POTENTIAL FOR
MISSION LOSS.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERS LOSS OF THE RADIATOR OR AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEMS
UNASSOCIATED WITH THE LOSS OF QD/CAP. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF QD/CAP
MAY ONLY NEGATE THE FES OPERATION AND THIS IS POTENTIAL FOR
MISSION LOSS. FURTHERMORE, THIS FMEA IS IDENTICAL TO
THE 06-1-0229-1 (ARPCS-367X) AND THEY BE COMBINED INTO ONE
ANALYSIS.











SWITCH - LOOP 1 (2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BASED ON LIMITED DATA PROVIDED, IOA COULD NOT IDENTIFY THIS ITEM
IN ORDER TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE ASSESSMENT OF ITS FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-2017-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY LIST FROM
POST 51-L ANALYSIS) RECEIVED, NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM
WAS ATTEMPTED. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA AND IOA
ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) NOT CREDIBLE,
THEREFORE IT WAS NOT STUDIED. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THIS FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FILTER, 10 MICRON (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE FILTER UNDER THE LINES AND
FITTINGS ANALYSIS. THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FOR THE FILTER ALONE IS
NOT CREDIBLE.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) NOT CREDIBLE,
THEREFORE IT WAS NOT STUDIED. THE FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE
RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO BE REALISTIC UNDER NOMINAL
CIRCUMSTANCES. CORROSION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE CAUSE SINCE ALL
MATERIALS ARE STAINLESS STEELAND NON-CORROSIVE. CONTAMINATION
IS RULED OUT, SINCE FILTERS PROVIDED IN THE LINE FOR THAT
PURPOSE; THE RESTRICTED FLOW IS COVERED FOR THE FILTERS. ALSO,
THE DEFORMED LINE PRESUMES CREW/WORKERS ERROR IN HANDLING THE
MATERIAL, AND THIS IS RULED OUT BY NSTS-22206. IOA SUGGESTS THIS
FAILURE TO BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR FILTERS, OR VALVE (FAILED
CLOSED).





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0123-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1621
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)





NASA [ 1 /I ] C ] C ]
IOA C 1 /i ] C ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]










ORIFICE, DIRECT BLEED (1)







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE (UNABLE TO RESTRICT - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) IS NOT
CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE IT WAS NOT STUDIED.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT RECOGNIZING THAT THIS FAILURE ON
THE OPERATING LOOP MAY NOT BE DETECTED.




ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-202 IX











FLOW RESTRICTOR, SPACE LAB OXYGEN
M.J. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [






IOA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE MODE (INABILITY TO RESTRICT) NOT
CREDIBLE, THEREFORE IT WAS NOT STUDIED.












LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) TO BE
CREDIBLE, THEREFORE IT WAS NOT STUDIED.





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0166-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]




ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-263 IX


















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONSIDERED RESTRICTED FLOW FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS ON THE LINE
SEPARATELY. THIS WAY THE FAILURE MODE WILL APPLY TO PARTICULAR
LOCATIONS WHERE THE EFFECTS MAY VARY THUS RESULTING IN DIFFERENT
CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYZED RESTRICTED FLOW MORE APPROPRIATELY WITH INDIVIDUAL
HARDWARE ON THE LINE. THIS WAY THE FAILURE MODE WILL APPLIED ON
PARTICULAR LOCATIONS ON THE LINE FOR WHICH THE EFFECTS MAY VARY.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ 3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ 3 *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RY__-




























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MODE, INABILITY TO RESTRICT, IS NOT REASONABLE FOR A
FLOW RESTRICTOR AND THEREFORE NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA. THE 06-1-
0158-1 ALREADY COVERS RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE.






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ANALYZED RESTRICTED FLOW MORE APPROPRIATELY WITH INDIVIDUAL
HARDWARE ON THE LINE. THIS WAY THE FAILURE MODE WILL APPLIED ON
PARTICULAR LOCATIONS ON THE LINE FOR WHICH THE EFFECTS MAY VARY.




ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-343 IX






RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE MODE (CRACKED MOUNTING FLANGE) NOT TO
BE CREDIBLE AND ASSUMES THAT A HARDWARE ITEM IS BUILT ON THE
DESIGN SPEC. THEREFORE MATERIAL DEFECT CANNOT BE A CAUSE. ALSO,
SHOCK AND VIBRATION IF OCCURRED TO CAUSE SUCH A FAILURE, THE
VEHICLE IS BELIEVED TO BE UNDERGOING A SERIOUS AND VERY DANGEROUS
CONDITION. THIS IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO, AND NOT ACCEPTABLE
TO IOA. THIS FAILURE MODE IS TO BE DELETED.






















NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE/_:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0206-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3611
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE (2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE MODE (CRACKED MOUNTING FLANGE) NOT BE
CREDIBLE AND ASSUMES THAT A HARDWARE ITEM IS BUILT ON THE DESIGN
SPEC. THEREFORE, MATERIAL DEFECT CANNOT BE A CAUSE. ALSO, SHOCK
AND VIBRATION IF OCCURRED TO CAUSE SUCH A FAILURE, THE
VEHICLE IS BELIEVED TO BE UNDERGOING A SERIOUS AND VERY DANGEROUS
CONDITION. THIS IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO, AND NOT ACCEPTABLE
TO IOA. THIS FAILURE MODE IS TO BE DELETED.
































































LEH 02 SUPPLY VALVE







LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE
LEH 02 SHUTOFF VALVE





































































































































































































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
30, Analysis of the ARPCS dated December 5, 1986. Prior results
were obtained independently and documented before starting the
FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was
performed to address failure modes not previously considered by
the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed,
parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode
possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional
criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in
NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i__00
October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom
of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the
top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
3 = All others
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













PREMATURE OPERATION, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES/OPENS













AUX. 02 ASSY. (02 SUPPLY PANEL)
CRITICALITIES


















NO EFFECT, SINCE THE TANK IS NO LONGER FLOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












































THE RESTRICTED FLOW WAS STUDIED UNDER INDIVIDUAL ITEMS ON THE
LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












FILTER, i0 MICRON (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA







THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FOR THE FILTER ALONE WAS CONSIDERED NOT
CREDIBLE AND ALREADY COVERED BY THE SAME FAILURE MODE FOR THE
LINES AND FITTINGS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA "AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER INDIVIDUAL ITEMS ON THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES : MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREVENTS 02 FLOW THROUGH THE LEH WHEN NEEDED. UNREGULATED FLOW
OF 02 TO CABIN THEREBY INCREASING POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FIRE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:






ORIFICE, DIRECT BLEED (i)
UNABLE TO RESTRICT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






THIS FAILURE MODE WAS CONSIDERED NOT CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE NOT
STUDIED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














































REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












FLOW RESTRICTOR, SPACE LAB OXYGEN
INABILITY TO RESTRICT














02/N2 CONTROL PANEL - P/L INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA







THIS FAILURE MODE IS CONSIDERED NOT CREDIBLE, AND THEREFORE IT
WAS NOT STUDIED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





IOA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE CAUSE RELATIONSHIP TO BE
CREDIBLE, AND THEREFORE NOT STUDIED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















GSE QUICK DISCONNECT (i)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE




3 ) N2 ASSEMBLY







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







THE CAP WILL PREVENT N2 LEAKAGE. HOWEVER, UNDER FUNCTIONAL LOSS,
IT WILL RESULT IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
NITROGEN TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-f1
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:





















N2/02 SUPPLY PANEL - REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA .AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]




THE RESTRITED FLOW WAS COVERED BY IOA FOR EACH ITEM ON THE LINE
IN SEPARATE ANALYSIS SHEETS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





THE RESTRICTED FLOW WAS COVERED BY IOA FOR EACH ITEM ON THE LINE
IN SEPARATE ANALYSIS SHEETS.
REFERENCES:












DAMAGED ELEMENT - FILTER



































REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:






ORIFICE, I0 LBM/HR (2)
INABILITY TO RESTRICT














O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL - PAYLOAD INTERFACE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF : /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






THIS FAILURE MODE IS JUDGED NOT TO BE CREDIBLE FOR AN ORIFICE.
THE RESTRICTION CAPABILITY IS INHERENT WITHIN THE DESIGN OF THE
ORIFICE AND IOA DID NOT SEE HOW THIS CAPABILITY COULD FAIL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL, WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, POSSIBLY CAUSING RESTRICTED FLOW IN THE ITEMS
DOWNSTREAM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
e












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA







THE RESTRITED FLOW WAS COVERED BY IOA FOR EACH ITEM ON THE LINE
IN SEPARATE ANALYSIS SHEETS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-17
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (CRACKED MOUNTING FLANGE)












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















VENT VALVE, MOTORIZED (2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CREW MODULE
PART NUMBER: MC250-0002-0090
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ON ISOL VALVE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE THE VENT VALVE
WILL BE CLOSED TO PREVENT OUTBOARD FLOW. HOWEVER, THE EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE ON THE VENT VALVE MAY DEPRESSURIZE THE CABIN VERY RAPIDLY
(CAPABLE OF 900 ibm/hr), THUS CREATING A SERIOUS CONDITION
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (CRACKED MOUNTING FLANGE)



































REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:






















O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL - WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINGLE FAILURE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL
NEGATE USE OF THE PRIMARY N2 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. CABIN
PRESSURE IS AVAILABLE FOR WATER MANAGEMENT. AT WORST, LOSS OF
MISSION MAY BE ANTICIPATED DUE TO DEGRADED OR LOSS OF THE
FES OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:






















O2/N2 CONTROL PANEL - WATER MANAGEMENT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINGLE FAILURE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL
NEGATE USE OF THE PRIMARY N2 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. CABIN
PRESSURE IS AVAILABLE FOR WATER MANAGEMENT. AT WORST, LOSS OF
MISSION MAY BE ANTICIPATED DUE TO DEGRADED OR LOSS OF THE
FES OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: SWITCH - LOOP 1 (2)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER TO "AUTO" OR "MAN" POSITION,
SHORTS TO GROUND





























IOA COULD NOT FIND THIS ITEM IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR OR MATCH ITS
FAILURE MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-23

APPENDIX F
NASA F14F_ TO TOA WOI_BHEET CROBB REFERENCE/RECOI_[ENDATIONB
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment




1 IOA recommends changing the second failure mode
described in the effects field.
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